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Treaties-Article 6 of the Convention on the
High Seas Is Not Self-Executing
United States v. Postal*
I. Introduction
In United States v. Postal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was con-
fronted with a complex question concerning the relationship between an inter-
national agreement and domestic law. The defendants in Postal were convicted'
of conspiring to import marijuana into the United States2 and of conspiring to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute. 3 On appeal, the defendants
claimed the district court lacked jurisdiction over them since they had been
seized in a foreign vessel on the high seas, beyond the twelve-mile limit. 4 This
claim was based upon article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas5 (High Seas
Convention) which reads in pertinent part: "Ships shall sail under the flag of
one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in interna-
tional treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas." The defendants argued that under this treaty provision they
were subject only to the jurisdiction of their vessel's home nation, the Grand
Cayman Islands, 6 at the time of their seizure.
The Fifth Circuit thus faced the question whether the United States can
assert jurisdiction over persons arrested aboard a foreign vessel seized beyond
the twelve-mile limit in violation of a treaty to which it and the vessel's home
nation were parties. 7 This question concerning article 6 of the High Seas Con-
vention arose as a case of first impression. The issue therefore became whether,
by its ratification of that agreement, the United States intended to incorporate
the treaty's language into its domestic law, and thereby preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction in contravention of its terms. As the Fifth Circuit was presented
with this question for the first time in the United States, the court's decision, if
accepted, will have significant impact both domestically and internationally.
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that, along with the
589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3218 (1979).
1 Id. at 865. The opinion of the United States district court was not reported.
2 21 U.S.C. 5 963 (1976).
3 Id. § 846.
4 The "territorial sea" is an area of the sea that begins at a nation's coastline and extends outward a
distance of not more than twelve miles. A nation's sovereignty extends over its territorial sea, and it may ex-
ercise exclusive jurisdiction therein. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for
signature April 29, 1958, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. While the United States
recognizes the traditional distance of three miles from the coast as the outer boundary of the territorial sea,
no international agreement on its precise size has been reached. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM.J. ITNT. L. 607, 610-16 (1958). The term "high seas" refers to the area
beyond a nation's territorial sea. A nation may also exercise limited jurisdiction over an area of the high seas
known as the "contiguous zone," which extends to a distance of twelve miles from the coast, hence, the
twelve-mile limit. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612.
5 Opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
6 The Grand Cayman Islands are a territory of the United Kingdom, and as such are subject to its
treaty obligations. 589 F.2d at 868 n.8.
7 Id. at 865.
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Constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto, all treaties made under the
authority of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." ' 8 In
this clause, the framers adopted the principle that treaties are to be accepted as
a binding part of this nation's domestic law after proper ratification. 9
Although the constitutional language requires a presumption that a treaty
be accepted as part of the supreme domestic law, in certain limited cases it is
required that a treaty entered into by the United States be accompanied by im-
plementing legislation prior to such acceptance. 10 Treaties which are im-
mediately given effect as supreme law are said to be "self-executing" or "self-
operative," while the others are termed "not self-executing" or "executory."
Executory treaties require specific implementing legislation to be enforced
under the authority of the Constitution." If the High Seas Convention is to
limit the jurisdiction of American courts, as was claimed by the Postal defen-
dants, the court must therefore have found it to have been incorporated into
our nation's domestic law, either by virtue of being self-executing, or through
implementing legislation. There is no such implementing legislation for the
High Seas Convention. Therefore the Fifth Circuit in Postal was faced with the
task of interpreting that treaty to determine whether article 6 was self-
executing.'
2
In its decision that article 6 is not self-executing, the Fifth Circuit based its
analysis primarily upon interpretation of outside materials relating to the treaty
and historical, governmental policies. The court's emphasis on these external
considerations, however, combined with its lack of concern for other inter-
pretive tools, yielded a determination of the question which does not stand up
to close scrutiny.
II. Statement of the Case
On September 15, 1976, officers of the United States Coast Guard cutter
Cape York sighted the defendants' sailing vessel, the La Rosa, approximately
eight and one-half nautical miles1 3 from the Florida coast. The La Rosa lacked
any readily apparent identification. The Cape York therefore approached the
unmarked vessel and inquired as to its nationality. After a brief dialogue which
failed to dispel his suspicion as to the La Rosa's identity or home port, the com-
manding officer of the Cape York requested permission to board. This request
was initially denied. Defendant Postal later agreed to the boarding, but
maneuvered erratically to make boarding more difficult, while jettisoning por-
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
9 This policy differs from that of many other nations, which require implementing legislation to incor-
porate treaty provisions into their domestic law. Aerovias Interamericanas De Panama, S.A. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Board of County
Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963).
10 This doctrine was first stated in Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and has
since been accepted virtually without question. An example of a treaty requiring implementing legislation is
one which appropriates monies from the United States, a function given solely to the Congress by the Con-
stitution. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141, Comment F
(1965).
11 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
12 589 F.2d at 876.
13 Nautical miles will be used throughout this comment.
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tions of the ship's log and charts. The initial boarding was eventually made ten
and one-half miles from the United States coast. Inspection of the ship's papers
showed the La Rosa to be of Grand Cayman registry. After satisfying himself
that the vessel's registration was in order, the boarding officer returned to the
Cape York.
Circumstances accompanying the initial boarding raised the suspicion
with the Coast Guardthat the defendants were involved in illegal activities.
1 4
After extensive communication with its operations center in Miami, the crew of
the Cape York received approval to make a second boarding of the La Rosa for
further investigation. After the first boarding, the La Rosa had immediately
changed course away from land, and thus, the second boarding occurred on the
high seas, approximately sixteen miles from the United States coast. The
government conceded that this boarding occurred beyond the twelve-mile
limit. 1 5
Immediately upon boarding, the officers read the defendants their Miranda
rights. Thereupon the defendants voluntarily showed the officers the eight
thousand pounds of marijuana stowed in the ship's hold. The defendants were
subsequently placed in custody and removed to the Cape York. The La Rosa was
then searched and towed into Miami.
III. Reaching the Issue
A. The Treaty Violation
Although several issues were raised on appeal,1 6 the Fifth Circuit focused
primarily on the question of jurisdiction over the defendants. Prior to deciding
the jurisdictional issue, however, a preliminary analysis was necessary to deter-
mine if there had been a treaty violation, because the defendants' jurisdictional
challenge was based upon such an alleged violation.
The Fifth Circuit held that because of the La Rosa's uncertain identity, the
initial boarding was justified under article 22 of the High Seas Convention.
1 7
The second boarding, however, had occurred beyond the twelve-mile limit of
the contiguous zone, 18 and was not authorized by any other treaty provisions. 1 9
The court, therefore, found that the seizure was made on the high seas in viola-
tion of article 6.
14 Defendant Postal asked the Coast Guard officer, "Can you be bought?" shortly after he boarded the
vessel. 589 F.2d at 866. Questions were also raised by the defendants' claim of Australian nationality and
other statements they made. Id. at 866-67.
15 Id. at 867 n.6.
16 The Fifth Circuit relied on recent cases to negate the defendants' claims of Miranda violations, lack of
jurisdiction over the crime, lack of statutory authority to make the seizure, fourth amendment abuses, insuf-
ficient evidence to show intent, and admission of hearsay statements in violation of Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968). 589 F.2d at 884-91. All of these subsidiary issues were overshadowed by the treaty
violation issue in the court's opinion. This comment, like the decision, will focus its attention on the ques-
tion of the treaty violation.
17 23 U.S.T. at 2318. Article 22 allows boarding a foreign merchant ship on the high seas by a warship
if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the foreign ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship. 589 F.2d at 870-72.
18 See note 4 supra.
19 The Fifth Circuit disposed of the contention that the seizure was authorized under article 23 of the
High Seas Convention, 13 U.S.T. at 2318-19, as being made in "hot pursuit." 589 F.2d at 872. The deci-
sion also declares that the boarding was not justified by the "right of approach" under article 22 of the same
treaty. Id. at 873.
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B. Relevance of the Ker-Frisbie Rule
After determining that the High Seas Convention had been violated, the
court was confronted with the Ker-Frisbie rule. This rule provides that a court
will not be deprived ofjurisdiction over a defendant merely because the person
is arrested and brought before the court in an unlawful manner . 20 Upon initial
analysis the Ker-Frisbie doctrine would seem to validate the court's jurisdiction
over the defendants in Postal, as the essence of their jurisdictional challenge was
illegal seizure.
The Postal situation does not fall within the scope of Ker-Frisbie, however,
because of a contrary doctrine which arose through judicial interpretation of
the Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors between
the United States and Great Britain. 21 This treaty, like the High Seas Conven-
tion, limits the power of the United States to seize foreign vessels on the high
seas. A line of cases from the Prohibition era, most importantly Cook v. United
States, 2 2 holds that seizure in contravention of the jurisdictional limitations of
this treaty will prevent United States courts from exercising jurisdiction over
the persons seized. 21 In Cook, the Supreme Court stated that in Ker v. Illinois
24
and similar cases, courts had jurisdiction since the only objection to the
seizures therein was that the United States had not conferred authority on the
person making the seizure to do so at the place where it was made. In cases
such as Cook, however, the seizure was illegal and jurisdiction invalid because
through the treaty, which was adopted into domestic law, the government had
"imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority. . . . Our Govern-
ment, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject
the vessel to our laws.' '25 Applying the principle of Cook to the case at bar, the
Fifth Circuit held that if article 6 of the High Seas Convention were self-
executing, and therefore adopted into domestic law, the United States would
be deprived of authority to assume jurisdiction over a foreign vessel and its
passengers seized on the high seas. 26 This conclusion required the Postal court
to decide whether article 6 is self-executing.
IV. Is Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas Self-Executing?
A. Criteria for Deciding Whether a Treaty Is Self-Executing
The question of whether a treaty is self-executing is to be answered by the
20 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886).
21 Signed January 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685. This treaty was adopted to ease tension
between the two nations resulting from the United States' seizure of British vessels to enforce Prohibition.
The treaty allowed seizure of vessels carrying liquor that were within one hour's reach of the American
coast.
22 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
23 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927);
United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927). These cases were spawned by Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
24 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
25 288 U.S. at 121. The treaty in Cook was adopted into domestic law by virtue of being self-executing.
Id. at 119.
26 589 F.2d at 875-76.
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courts if it arises in litigation. 2 7 In resolving this issue, the primary criterion for
a court is whether it was the intent of the parties that the treaty would become
binding without any implementing legislation. 28 This intent is seldom, if ever,
specifically stated within the treaty itself. It is therefore necessary to identify
methods of ascertaining the hidden intent of the parties. Although many cases
have examined treaties to determine whether they are self-executing, the in-
dividual nature of each document militates against devising a uniform
systematic procedure. The only guidance available is that which can be
gleaned from individual judicial opinions.
1.Express Language of the Treaty
A treaty is essentially a contract between two nations. As with any con-
tract, it is generally agreed that the most important factor for determining in-
tent is the language embodied in the document itself. 29 Reference to the express
language does not guarantee a simple answer, but does provide a starting point
on which to place primary emphasis in the interpretive process.
Several principles have been asserted to determine from the language of a
treaty whether the parties intended it to be self-executing. One such rule pro-
vides that treaty provisions which are clear enough to be effectuated by the
courts without implementing legislation were intended to be self-executing.
30
Although this appears merely to restate whether the treaty is self-executing, it
does indicate a judicial preference for finding a treaty to be self-operative if
reasonably possible within the scope of its language. This preference is sup-
ported by the well-accepted principle that a treaty is to be liberally construed to
protect the rights guaranteed therein.
3
1
A second principle of textual interpretation used by the courts provides
that a treaty is the supreme law of the land, as is a congressional act,
"whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private
citizen or subject may be determined. ' 3 2 When the treaty rights accorded a
private citizen are enforceable in a court of law, that court must look to the
treaty for its decision as it would look to a statute in other cases.
3 3
A final criterion for language interpretation is found in the decision of one
court to view as self-executing treaty provisions which declare, by negative
stipulation, that something shall not be done.3 4 The "negative stipulation" test
is closely related to the first textual criterion, because a treaty provision which
stipulates that a certain act shall not be done would almost certainly be clear
27 Id. at 876; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREION RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 154(1)
(1965).
28 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899). See also Henry, When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MIcH. L.
REv. 776 (1929); Note, Self-Execution of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Under United States Law, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1976).
29 Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 273 (1909); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Comment, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 238, 241.
30 See Comment, supra note 29, at 239. For expression of related principles, see Asakura v. City of Seat-
tle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Henry, supra note 28, at 779-80.
31 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Aerovies, 197 F. Supp. at 240.
32 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
33 Id.
34 Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. 697 (1878).
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enough to be effectuated by the judiciary without implementing legislation.
The "negative stipulation" test provides a more objective rule to apply than
does the first textual principle, however.
2. Outside Materials
In some cases, a thorough examination of the language of a treaty is insuf-
ficient to enable the court to ascertain whether the agreement was intended to
be self-operative. The court must then turn to materials outside the document.
Such external materials, however, should be utilized only as a secondary
source of interpretation.35
When looking to outside sources, it is necessary to examine a broad range
of materials, as different sources may indicate conflicting intentions. The
history and circumstances surrounding the negotiations, supplemental reports,
congressional testimony, executive statements, subsequent practice under the
agreement, and many other factors have been found to be relevant.
36
More than any other external factor, the construction given by the ex-
ecutive branch, though not conclusive, is accorded great deference by the
courts in deciding whether a treaty is self-executing.3 7 This approach is well ad-
vised, as it reflects the interpretation of the formulator of the treaty. Frequent-
ly, however, the executive branch does not express an opinion whether a treaty
is self-executing, leaving its intent to be determined from indirect and tangen-
tially related statements. For such situations, it has been proposed that the
treaty must be presumed to be self-executing if the President did not request
implementing legislation when it was sent for ratification. The underlying ra-
tionale for this test is that it would be absurd to assume the President would
enter into an international agreement without intending that it be given full
domestic effect.3 8 This test, however, has only been stated in one decision, 39
and therefore cannot be accepted as dispositive.
B. Application of the Interpretive Criteria to Article 6
of the High Seas Convention
In Postal, the Fifth Circuit did an extensive analysis of many external fac-
tors and decided article 6 is not self-executing. Consequently, it is not incor-
porated into domestic law. As a result, the court found that article 6 did not
preclude exercising jurisdiction over the defendants and upheld their convic-
tions. However, the court's emphasis on outside materials rather than exten-
sive textual analysis, coupled with an often questionable interpretation of the
35 Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d at 851; Note, supra note 28, at 395-96. While there might conceivably
be instances in which outside materials could override the language of the treaty, they would be rare.
36 589 F.2d at 877.
37 Aerovias, 197 F. Supp. at 247; Comment, supra note 29, at 243.
38 Aerovias, 197 F. Supp. at 248. If a treaty were executory and no implementing legislation were re-
quested, the result would be that the treaty would not be given full domestic effect. For further information
concerning the President's duty to seek implementing legislation for an executory treaty provision, see
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 140, Comment b, Illustration
4 (1965); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 158-59 n.* (1972).
39 Aerovias, 197 F. Supp. at 248.
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materials examined, produced a decision contrary to the intent of the treaty as
reflected in its language. An analysis of article 6 in accordance with the criteria
discussed above suggests that it should be interpreted as self-executing.
1. Language of the Treaty
As previously asserted, the single most important criterion for discerning
the intent of the parties is an examination of the language of the treaty itself. In
Postal, however, the court, quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
40
said that "[i]n carrying out our interpretive task, 'we may look beyond the
written words . .' "41 and launched immediately into a lengthy examination
of outside materials. The court virtually ignored the express language of article
6 with only the casual statement that "[o]n its face, this language would bear a
self-executing construction .... ,,42 The court's reliance on Choctaw Nation is
questionable, however, because later, in the same paragraph from which the
Fifth Circuit quoted, the Supreme Court stated, "But even Indian treaties can-
not be rewritten or expanded beyond their clear terms . . . to achieve the asserted
understanding of the parties. 43 Further, the Court in Choctaw Nation said there
was no finding of fact that the two tribes intended to agree on something dif-
ferent than what appeared on the face of the treaty, and "[w]ithout such a
finding the agreement must be interpreted according to its unambiguous
language. 44 In Postal there was no finding of intention contrary to the express
language of the treaty. Choctaw Nation would therefore seem to require a
rigorous scrutiny of the language of article 6, rather than to authorize looking
beyond the language to outside materials.
As noted above, the language of article 6 does indicate a self-executing in-
tent. Application of the language interpretation tests previously discussed fur-
ther.emphasizes this intent.
The first language test is whether the treaty provisions are clear enough to
be given effect by the courts without implementing legislation. Article 6 ap-
pears to pass this test by unambiguously stating that in the absence of some
other treaty provision a ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its home
nation while on the high seas.
45
The other criteria of language interpretation also suggest that article 6 is
self-executing. The Postal defendants claimed, in consonance with the rules of
international law stated in article 6 of the High Seas Convention, the right to
be free from United States jurisdiction while sailing on the high seas beyond
the twelve-mile limit. That right, which is clearly specified, certainly is the
40 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
41 589 F.2d at 877. The interpretation in Choctaw Nation was not to determine if the treaty were self-
executing, but to determine the meaning of the contents of the agreement. While the case is therefore not
directly on point, the language referred to in Postal and this comment would seem to be equally applicable to
a determination of whether a treaty is self-executing.
42 Id.
43 318 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
44 Id.
45 The defendants' vessel, of Grand Cayman registry, was seized on the high seas. There are no other
treaty provisions to give the United States jurisdiction over the vessel. See note 19 supra.
[Voh 55:293]
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right of a "private citizen or subject," and therefore article 6 would be self-
operative by the second principle of textual interpretation.
46
The final textual principle also supports the proposition that the treaty
provision in question is self-executing. The "exclusive jurisdiction" language
used in article 6 necessarily carries with it an implicit "negative stipulation"
that no nation except the vessel's home state may exercise jurisdiction over it.
Two further points concerning the language of article 6 reinforce the inter-
pretation that it is self-executing. In Hennebique Const. Co. v. Myers, 47 the Third
Circuit considered the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
188348 and the supplemental Additional Act of 1900. 49 On a point with which
the majority opinion agreed, 5° the concurring opinion of Judge Archibald
stated that any doubt as to whether the treaty in question was self-executing
was disposed of by article 18 therein, which provided that the treaty should go
into effect within a month after the exchange of ratifications.5 1 Article 34 of the
High Seas Convention contains an essentially identical provision, adding
credence to a self-executing interpretation of that treaty under the Hennebique
rationale.
52
Finally, as noted in Postal,53 if a treaty expressly provides for future
legislative action, it is uniformly regarded as executory. Articles 27, 28, and 29
of the High Seas Convention specifically provide for such legislative action for
matters unrelated to the jurisdiction issue in Postal. 5 4 Although those provisions
are not self-executing, it does not follow that article 6 is also executory. It is ac-
cepted that some portions of a treaty may be self-executing and other portions
executory. 55 The High Seas Convention was the skillfully drafted product of an
extremely competent international conference. 56 It seems highly likely,
therefore, that articles 27 through 29 were purposely drafted to be executory
and thus reserve the implementation of those provisions to the discretion of the
individual nations. Had the draftsmen intended the other articles to be ex-
ecutory, it seems likely that it would have been made apparent. However, no
46 See note 32 supra and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that treaties often guarantee certain private
rights in a "positive" fashion, such as the right of foreign citizens to do business in the United States.
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). In such cases it is evident that the treaty in question
prescribes a rule for the rights of private citizens. In Postal and article 6 ofthe High Seas Convention, a more
negatively defined right is at issue. It is the right not to be interfered with by a nation other than the vessel's
home nation. While the "negative right" of article 6 assumes a different posture than the "positive rights"
which are often at issue, it nonetheless clearly concerns a right of a private citizen, and therefore falls within
the scope of the second principle of language interpretation.
47 172 F. 869 (3d Cir. 1909).
48 Exchange of rataications June 6, 1884, 25 Stat. 1372.
49 Signed December 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936.
50 172 F. at 873-74.
51 Id. at 888.
52 For comparison, the pertinent portions of the two treaties follow.
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. XVIII, 25 Stat. at 1379, provides: "The
present Convention shall be put into execution within a month after exchange of ratifications, and shall re-
main in force.., until the expiration of one year from the day upon which the denunciation shall be made."
Convention on the High Seas, art. 34, 13 U.S.T. at 2320-21, provides: "1. This Convention shall come into
force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification .
53 589 F.2d at 876-77.
54 13 U.S.T. at 2320. These articles being executory may seem to contradict the inference drawn from
article 34 of the High Seas Convention and Hennebique. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text. This is
not necessarily so, however, as the remainder of the treaty could be effective without the legislation required
by those three articles being enacted.
55 Note, 10 TEx. INT. L.J. 138, 146 (1975).
56 Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 CoLuM. L. REv. 234 (1959).
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such language is used concerning article 6, allowing an inference that it was in-
tended to be self-executing.
2. Outside Materials
As a result of the foregoing language interpretation, a reasonable
presumption arises that article 6 was intended to be self-executing. As
previously mentioned, a treaty's language is of primary importance for
deciding whether it is self-executing. Additionally, an examination of outside
materials gives further support to the presumption that article 6 is self-
executing.
The opinion of the executive branch, though not conclusive, is given great
weight in deciding whether a treaty is self-operative. 57 There has not been a
specific executive statement, however, as to whether article 6 of the High Seas
Convention is self-executing. The court in Postal looked to testimony by the
chairman of the United States delegation to the treaty conference before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and concluded that although the
testimony was "not wholly unequivocal," it did indicate the treaty was not in-
tended to be self-executing. 58 The Fifth Circuit also placed much emphasis on a
State Department statement that some supplementary and new implementing
legislation might be necessary. 59 If implementing legislation were necessary,
the treaty would be executory by definition. The court failed to mention,
however, that the State Department subsequently supplemented that state-
ment, and informed the committee that in its opinion "no implementing




In addition to the above statements, it is significant to note that'the Presi-
dent sought no implementing legislation for the High Seas Convention when it
was sent for ratification. As mentioned earlier, one court has stated that it
would be absurd to think that a president did not intend to give full effect to a
treaty he entered into, and therefore this failure to request legislation supports
57 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
58 589 F.2d at 881-82.
59 Id. at 882. The question and answer alluded to by the Fifth Circuit follow.
28. Question. Would you point out and explain any article of these conventions which has the ef-
fect of superseding domestic legislation in the United States, either federal or state legislation?
Would you also point out any articles which will require new federal legislation?
Answer. It does not appear that any of the convention provisions conflict with existing legislation.
It does appear, however, that some supplementary and new implementing legislation may be
necessary or desirable. (A detailed answer on this aspect will be furnished shortly.)
Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Hearings on Executives J,K,L,M,N Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
60 Senate Hearings, supra note 59, at 92. This supplementary statement was not declared to be per-
manently conclusive, and the State Department said it would continue holding the matter under advise-
ment. Id. As far as this commentator could discover, however, that "temporary" supplementary statement
has never been changed.
61 Articles 27-29 of the High Seas Convention, 13 U.S.T. at 2320, specifically call for each party to the
treaty to take legislative measures regarding areas of maritime law unrelated to the jurisdiction issue in
Postal. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. It is probable that the legislation called for in these articles
was not the "implementing" legislation referred to in the above-cited question and answer. Since the treaty
specifically requires such legislation, the United States Senate would not need a State Department opinion
on the question of its necessity. Rather, it seems safe to assume that the legislation referred to was a broader
legislative pronouncement putting the entire treaty into execution.
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the presumption that article 6 is self-executing. 62 In addition, the President's
proclamation of the treaty's entry into force also supports the opinion that it
was intended to be self-executing.
63
The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on past American policies of asserting
jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, and stated that it was unlikely article
6 was intended to be self-executing because it would be "wholly inconsonant
with the historical policy of the United States.' '64 Basing a determination of
whether a treaty is self-executing upon its effect on historical practice or ex-
isting legislation is a questionable method of treaty interpretation, however,
because one of the primary characteristics of a self-executing treaty is that it
supersedes existing practice and legislation. 65 Deciding that a treaty is ex-
ecutory because it is contrary to tradition or existing legislation therefore effec-
tively and unacceptably nullifies a critical element of the definition of a self-
executing treaty.
If consideration is given to historical American policy, however, the High
Seas Convention does not represent a major reversal. The United States has
not regularly seized foreign vessels on the high seas in the absence of treaty pro-
visions allowing such seizure. 66 Those seizures which have been made have
generally been within the twelve-mile limit, a zone over which jurisdiction was
expressly retained by treaty, 67 after adoption of the High Seas Convention.
Based upon the foregoing, the Fifth Circuit's emphasis upon historical inter-
pretation appears unwarranted.
Finally, in examining outside material, it is necessary to look at inter-
pretations of the treaty by other courts. As previously stated, there have been
no other cases specifically deciding the question of whether article 6 is self-
executing. Dicta in two cases, however, strongly suggest that the courts as-
sumed the High Seas Convention was self-executing. In United States v.
Cadena, 68 a different panel of the Fifth Circuit stated, "The Convention [on the
High Seas], if applicable, supersedes prior domestic law to the contrary ... in-
cluding the authority provided by 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)." 69 The Postal defendants
were arrested under the authority of section 89(a).70
In United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 71 the court stated that "[o]n
the high seas, only the vessels of the United States Government may exercise
62 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
63 NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States
of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the said Convention to the end that the same
and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, on and after
September 30, 1962, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of
America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
13 U.S.T. at 2387. This would certainly seem to include enforcement of the treaty by the nation's courts.
64 589 F.2d at 880.
65 Cook, 288 U.S. at 118; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
141(1) (1965).
66 Until 1922, seizure of foreign vessels beyond the three-mile territorial sea was only allowed for in-
bound vessels. When, in 1922, the United States began exercising jurisdiction over non-inbound vessels
beyond its territorial sea, it caused such an international protest that the Convention for the Prevention of
Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors (see note 21 supra and accompanying text) was drafted to limit American
jurisdiction on the high seas in direct reaction to the seizures. Cook, 288 U.S. at 112-19.
67 See note 4 supra.
68 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
69 Id. at 1260.
70 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976).
71 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'dper curiam, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976).
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jurisdiction over United States flag vessels," and cited article 6 of the High
Seas Convention as authority. 72 In other cases where the treaty is referred to,
although the self-executing issue is not raised, there is no indication by the
courts that it is viewed as being executory.
73
3. Broader Concerns
In Postal, the court did not give any consideration to broader, more all-
encompassing factors when deciding if article 6 is self-executing. While such
considerations certainly should not be conclusive, they are relevant in deter-
mining t1he perspective from which the question of whether a treaty is self-
executing should be approached.
Initially, the importance of treaty obligations should militate against un-
due haste in declaring the treaty to be executory, and therefore unenforceable
by the courts without special legislation. It has been said that "the most fun-
damental rule of international law is that of the sanctity of treaty
obligations." 74 Although the question of whether a treaty is self-executing is to
be decided by domestic tribunals, the international obligation of the United
States to enforce and abide by its treaties cannot be ignored.
Closely related to international obligations is the consideration that the
honor of the United States is involved each time the courts decide the question
of whether or not a treaty is self-executing. 7 5 This factor deserves special em-
phasis at the present time when the world community is increasingly seeking to
maintain order by international agreement; in the final analysis, the only
reasonable and truly effective means of treaty enforcement is the self-
enforcement of each nation. Failure to abide by international agreements is an
affront to world order which brings opprobrium to the guilty nation. The
prestige and honor of the United States as a leader of the world community
should not be risked through a breach of treaty provisions unless the situation
clearly requires it. Postal does not represent such a situation.
All of these broader considerations favor approaching the question of
whether a treaty is self-executing from the perspective that it should be inter-
preted as self-executing if at all possible within the scope of its language.
V. Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the Fifth Circuit has
departed from the rule that an agreement within the constitutional limitations
of treaty-making power is, by virtue of article VI of the Constitution, the
"supreme Law of the Land." As stated by the Supreme Court, a treaty within
those limits must be enforced by the courts in litigation of private rights. 76 In-
stead of following the presumption that a treaty is self-executing unless clearly
72 405 F. Supp. at 882.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Petrulla, 457 F. Supp. 1367 (M.D. Fla. 1978); United States v. F/V Taiyo
Maru, Number 28, S01600, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Maine 1975).
74 C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 517 (4th ed. 1965).
75 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884).
76 Maiorano, 213 U.S. at 272-73. It is unquestioned that the High Seas Convention is within the Presi-
dent's treaty-making power.
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proved to the contrary," the Fifth Circuit has reversed it, and effectively ruled
that a treaty is to be deemed executory unless outside materials show a contrary
intent.
The Postal decision is of great precedential value since it is the first judicial
opinion on whether article 6 is self-executing. Aside from this, however, the
decision may have other immediate and practical effects.
First, the decision may effectively expand Coast Guard authority over
vessels on the high seas. Presently, Coast Guard regulations preclude boarding
a foreign vessel on the high seas in contravention of any treaty. 78 After Postal,
violation of this regulation will lose the effective check provided by the Cook-
Ford principle. 79 With the rise of Miami as a center of illicit drug traffic, 80 the
protective cloak of Postal is likely to encourage violations of international law,8 1
treaty commitments, and federal regulations, by allowing courts to exercise
jurisdiction over drug smugglers seized beyond the twelve-mile limit.
8 2
Although sanctions against narcotics smugglers should not be relaxed, it is im-
perative to utilize methods of effectively controlling that traffic which fall more
circumspectly within the bounds of the law.
The Fifth Circuit's decision could also affect future judicial treaty inter-
pretation. Postal's emphasis on outside materials, with only cursory considera-
tion of the document's express language, is a significant departure from more
traditional treaty interpretation. If the decision is widely followed, it could
serve to shift the focus in future decisions from rigorous textual analysis to
determinations based upon extrinsic materials. Such a shift is unacceptable.
With ratification, a nation assents to a treaty's language, not to the asserted
meaning shown in any related external materials. Failure to strictly abide by
that language will unnecessarily weaken not only the rights sought to be
assured in those agreements, but also the rational international order sought to
be maintained through their use.
Lorne Oral Liechty
77 Comment, supra note 29, at 248.
78 19 C.F.R: 5 162.3(a) (1979). This did not deny jurisdiction over the defendants because of the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine. 589 F.2d at 885.
79 See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
80 Ficken, The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone: An
Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 700 (1975).
81 The preamble to the Convention on the High Seas declares it to be a codification of international
law. 13 U.S.T. at 2314.
82 Seizure of narcotics smugglers on the high seas is unlikely to cause the international protest like that
engendered by seizure of liquor smugglers during Prohibition. This is because narcotics smuggling receives
almost universal opprobrium, but the liquor trade was a well-respected institution in virtually every nation
except the United States during Prohibition. Protest of a treaty violation by an individual's home nation is
not a prerequisite to enforcement of treaty rights by American courts. Head Money Gases, 112 U.S. at 597.
It would, however, certainly encourage closer adherence to treaty provisons.
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